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Abstract
The food democracy discourse has emerged as a normatively grounded critique of an increasingly transnational agri-food
system and its dominant co-regulatory mode of governance, where private and public norms and standards interact with
public policy and regulation in complex ways. Analyzing competing agri-food discourses through a legitimacy lens can con-
tribute to understanding how authority is transferred from traditional, hierarchical and state-centered constellations to a
range of novel agri-food governance arrangements. This article reconstructs and compares the legitimacy constructions ar-
ticulated in the co-regulation and the food democracy discourses, generating three key findings: first, there are two distinct
articulations of food democracy discourse, which we label liberal and strong food democracy; second, while conceptualiza-
tions of legitimacy in the liberal food democracy and the co-regulatory discourse share many commonalities, legitimacy in
the co-regulatory discourse relies more heavily on output, while the liberal food democracy discourse is more sensitive to
issues of input and throughput legitimacy; third, the strong food democracy discourse articulates a critical counter-model
that emphasizes inclusive deliberation which in turn is expected to generate a shared orientation towards the common
good and countervailing power.
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1. Introduction
In recent decades, the governance of the agri-food
system has increasingly involved private actors, includ-
ing food producers, third-party auditors and certifiers,
civil society organizations (CSOs), and food retailers. In
this shift from public authority to hybrid food gover-
nance, responsibilities and interests collide, layer and
diverge (Verbruggen & Havinga, 2017). This practice of
‘co-regulation’ is reflected in an extensive academic and
practitioner discourse. Public-private co-regulation has
affected the “fundamental ways that people eat, how
much they pay for food and how it reaches the din-
ing table, mostly without public knowledge” (Rudder,
Fritschler, & Choi, 2016, p. 21). The challenge posed
by global value chains to public oversight is exempli-
fied by a frozen pizza in a supermarket in Ireland which,
when tested by public authorities after the horse meat
scandal in 2013, was found to contain ingredients from
35 countries that had transited through 60 countries and
5 continents (National Audit Office, 2013). In addition
to concerns about how food is produced, distributed
and consumed, there are also wider societal issues inter-
twined with co-regulation, including concerns over work-
ers’ rights, migration, ecological sustainability, gender
issues, rural livelihoods, trade and global food security
(Fuchs, Kalfagianni, & Havinga, 2009).
A body of research and activism has emerged to de-
bate how co-regulation establishes decision-making au-
thority, and if this authority can or should be democrati-
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cally legitimized. As Havinga (2018) argues, unlike public
bodies who derive legitimacy from democratic mandate,
private sector organizations, such as retailers or agribusi-
nesses, must find legitimacy through other strategies,
such as claiming to speak for consumers or to deliver pub-
lic goods. In this way, legitimacy can be created or ques-
tioned through discourses which connect norms and val-
ues to practices (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
The need of private actors in particular to “strategi-
cally influence the construction of legitimacy” has been
widely recognized (Dendler & Dewick, 2016, p. 240).
While it is difficult to judge the discursive effects of such
strategies (Leipold, Feindt, Keller, & Winkel, 2019), it is
worthwhile to reconstruct and critically assess logics of
legitimacy, particularly as they deploy democratic norms
to build a social license to operate (Suchman, 1995).
While earlier research has explored constructions of le-
gitimacy of co-regulation in agri-food systems (Fuchs &
Kalfagianni, 2010; Hachez & Wouters, 2011; Halabi &
Lin, 2017) and in transnational public-private governance
more generally (Flohr, 2010; Uhlin, 2010), our approach
links legitimacy analysis of co-regulation to analysis of a
discourse which challenges this “corporate system that
sells food grown, processed and controlled thousands
of miles away” (Johnston, Biro, & MacKendrick, 2009,
p. 510): the food democracy discourse.
Since WWII, co-regulation has evolved in several
stages in response tomajor agri-food systemchanges: lib-
eralization and globalization (Levi-Faur, 2009), advances
in science (Winickoff, Jasanoff, Busch, Grove-White, &
Wynne, 2005), increases in inequality (Smith, 2009),
and awareness of food scandals (Ansell & Vogel, 2006).
Beyond food security and availability, new and often in-
terrelated concerns (i.e., food safety, quality, and later,
social, environmental, animal welfare and climate is-
sues) have evolved over time to encompass local, re-
gional, national and transnational institutions with over-
lapping tasks (Feindt & Flynn, 2009). To ensure reli-
able operation of today’s globalized commodity markets,
transnational value chains and differentiated consumer
demands, a proliferation of private standards and norms
has emerged which interact with national regulation and
international law (Purnhagen, 2015). This co-regulatory
system sits on top of producer-oriented agricultural poli-
cies that provide income support and often also legal ex-
ceptions for producers in many countries (Daugbjerg &
Feindt, 2017). Although private standards are only sub-
ject to private contract law, they have become de facto
mandatory for many food producers in order to access
food retail markets (Fuchs et al., 2009).
Since the 1990s, an emerging food democracy dis-
course has problematized the lack of public participation
and accountability in the agri-food system, with a partic-
ular focus on reclaiming power from corporations (Lang,
1992, 1999). In contrast to the co-regulation discourse—
which stipulates a cooperative, complimentary and un-
avoidable nature of public-private co-regulation—the
food democracy discourse revolves around a normative
model of agri-food governance in which private actors re-
main firmly subjected to control by the demos through
state oversight, market competition and civic activism.
Thus, the food democracy discourse delineates public
versus private control as a key battleground (Hassanein,
2008). Focusing on local consequences of global cor-
poratization, food democracy proponents challenge the
legitimacy of private standards and public-private co-
regulation. They aim to rebuild legitimacy of agri-food
governance by establishing transparent and responsive
framework conditions for the sustainable and just pro-
duction and distribution of food, and for maintaining
value for consumers and producers (Anderson, 2008).
Whether and how food democracy constitutes a suc-
cessful counter-discourse to co-regulation is debated.
Critics assert that food democracy may reinforce neolib-
eral norms of private food control (Johnston et al., 2009;
Moragues-Faus, 2016). Alternative foodmovements that
invoke democracy norms may mediate the “legitimation
crisis” of corporate governance following food scares,
and open “new and lucrative forms of consumption by
endowing agribusiness with an image of responsibility
and caring” (Guthman, 1998, p. 148). While food democ-
racy proponents take issue with corporate control, many
similar tropes and motives (e.g., the inclusion of ethi-
cal and sustainability concerns), drive both co-regulation
and food democracy. A discursive analysis of legitimacy
constructions can help to identify potential overlaps and
incommensurability, which is a key step in understand-
ing the contested political arguments embedded in cur-
rent debates over control of agri-food governance; these
debates include whether democracy norms apply to pri-
vate actors, or whether traditional democracy norms de-
vised for the relationship between states and citizens can
be transferred to private organizations and consumers
(Steffek, 2003). In examining the potential of a counter-
discourse such as food democracy, the degree to which
other actors, such as states and civil society, help legit-
imize private control is also scrutinized. Though schol-
ars of co-regulation (Wolf, 2006) and of food democracy
(Anderson, 2008) argue that the state’s inability or un-
willingness to safeguard food values required more con-
trol by private actors, others, such as Sønderskov and
Daugbjerg (2010), have found evidence that private stan-
dards rely heavily on states for legitimacy. Therefore, this
article aims to answer the following research questions:
Howdo dominant discursive and counter-discursive legit-
imacy constructions interlink or conflict in ways that pro-
duce new norms for agri-food governance?Within these
constructions, how is democratic authority transferred
and distributed across the public, private and civil soci-
ety sectors?
As the basis for this discussion, we first outline a
conceptual typology of legitimacy and our methodology
for an analytical literature review. We then present our
analysis, which finds two distinct articulations of food
democracy, which we label liberal food democracy and
strong food democracy. While the liberal food democ-
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racy discourse resonateswith legitimacy constructions in
the co-regulation discourse, strong food democracy con-
stitutes a pronounced counter-discourse.
2. Conceptual Framework: Legitimacy, Discourse
and Power
Legitimacy is considered a crucial element in creating
and maintaining the power to govern. Following Weber
(1922), legitimacy is rooted in the belief that the exercise
of political-administrative power is in accordance with
deep-seated normative and cognitive ideas. Legitimacy
depends on “the belief in rightness of the decision or pro-
cess of decision-making” (Dahl, 2006, p. 46). Legitimacy
beliefs make it more likely that people adopt desired be-
haviors and accept decisions that they dislike, thereby
decreasing the need to provide material incentives or
to threaten the use of force (for a power-based inter-
pretation of democratic legitimacy, see Bornemann &
Weiland, 2019).
The cognitive and normative beliefs about legitimacy
are shaped by discourse, and in turn guide the design and
support the authority of new policies and regulations
(Feindt & Oels, 2005; Leipold et al., 2019). A discourse
is understood here as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts
and categories through which meaning is given to social
and physical phenomena, and which is produced and re-
produced through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer
& Versteeg, 2005, p. 175). From a discourse-analytical
perspective, policies and regulations are products of
“discursive contests over the framing of politics, actors,
and underlying societal norms” (Fuchs & Kalfagianni,
2010, p. 67).
Democratic legitimacy is a complex concept. Inspired
by Abraham Lincoln’s famous description of legitimate
rule as government “of the people, by the people and
for the people” (Williams, 1980, p. 259), a distinction be-
tween input legitimacy (rule by the people), output legit-
imacy (effectiveness for the people) and throughput le-
gitimacy (quality of the governing processes) has been
widely established in theories of democracy (Feindt,
2001; Scharpf, 1999; Schmidt, 2012). Norms of democ-
racy are manifested differently in the agri-food system,
e.g., via representation of specified stakeholder groups
and forms of participation. For the purpose of our anal-
ysis, we have operationalized articulations of input, out-
put and throughput legitimacy as expressed in agri-food
governance discourses (see Table 1).
Input legitimacy is based on the belief that all citizens
or all those affected have a fair and equal chance to in-
fluence authoritative decisions. It is linked to forms of
political participation so as to ensure that governing bod-
ies are accountable to those governed (Scharpf, 1999). In
agri-food governance, consumers and citizens are used
at times interchangeably as proxies for wider public rep-
resentation (Hamilton, 2005). Participation requires fur-
ther qualifiers such as inclusiveness and equality (Fuchs
et al., 2009). Output legitimacy is based on the per-
ceived capacity of a political system to effectively solve
collective problems (Scharpf, 1999). The importance of
output legitimacy reflects a level of delegated respon-
sibility to experts and representatives (Majone, 1998).
However, stakeholders will often prioritize some prob-
lems over others, or interpret solutions very differently
(Fuchs&Kalfagianni, 2009), so that output legitimacy can
be contested. Output legitimacy is not necessarily linked
to democratic processes and has therefore been inter
alia criticized as an “effectiveness-based surrogate” for
democratic norms (Hachez & Wouters, 2011, p. 685).
Tensions between citizen participation and problem-
solving effectiveness are frequent (Dahl, 2006). The rad-
ical plurality and complexity of contemporary societies
Table 1. Legitimacy types and indicators in agri-food governance.
Legitimacy Type Norms from democracy theory Indicators for agri-food governance
Input legitimacy Participation by the people; demands
articulated through formal and informal
channels and political mobilization (e.g.,
protest, demonstrations, activism); inclusion
of all relevant knowledge
Inclusive and equal opportunity for all food
consumers and producers for regular and
protected participation in the articulation of
demands, rule-making and monitoring;
inclusive representation on regulatory
bodies; inclusion of relevant local,
practitioner and scientific knowledge
Output legitimacy Efficiency for the people; effective solutions
to collective problems; policies that benefit
the majority; protection of minority rights
Perception of the efficient provision of safe,
sustainable, healthy, culturally adequate food
and diverse food choices for all societal
groups
Throughput Legitimacy Processes with the people; efficacy of
participation, accountability, transparency,
inclusiveness and openness to interest
consultation; reliable procedures; sound
reasoning and inclusive deliberation;
procedural justice
Institutionalized fair and orderly processes of
deliberation, rule-making, implementation
and monitoring—transparency, opportunity
for meaningful participation processes,
inclusive deliberation, responsiveness
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makes unanimous assessment of a given output unlikely
(normative ambivalence) and causal attribution of sys-
temic effects—such as rising obesity, biodiversity loss
or antibiotic resistance—difficult. Throughput legitimacy
denotes the belief that decisions and outcomes are
based on transparent and reliable institutionalized pro-
cesses. A belief that prescribed procedures have been
followed makes it more likely that even undesired out-
comes are accepted, e.g., a lost election or court case
(Luhmann, 1969). However, compliance in transnational
governance is typically less motivated by a belief in
procedural arrangements than by substantive reasons
and material interests (Mayntz, 2010). Throughput le-
gitimacy has been described as bridging input and out-
put legitimacy through the quality of institutional pro-
cesses that ensure responsiveness to public demands
(Fuchs et al., 2009; Schmidt, 2012). This requires produc-
tive, transparent and deliberative processes so that de-
mands are “adequately channeled in societal and admin-
istrative decision-making, thereby improving account-
ability” (Schmidt, 2012, p. 24). The concept can be ex-
tended to apply to public-private and even to private agri-
food governance. For example, deliberative procedures
in transnational private governance would require de-
liberation between representatives of all affected stake-
holders, and responsiveness beyond immediate busi-
ness interests.
In order to reconstruct legitimacy in each discourse,
a review of the research literature on food democracy
and public-private co-regulation was conducted. In the
next section, we discuss the methodological process of
data collection and analysis, followed by the conceptual
synthesis of the legitimacy constructions in co-regulation
and food democracy discourse.
3. Methodology
As our primary objective is to explore co-regulation
and food democracy through the lens of legitimacy, we
conducted an analytical review of scholarly knowledge
and grey literature in each field. The data collections
were performed separately: first, a systematic literature
review of food democracy (for a complete overview,
see Behringer, 2019); second, we conducted a more
focused search of literature on co-regulation and pri-
vate agri-food standards which yielded both theoreti-
cal and empirical commentaries. These sources included
peer-reviewed journals, edited book chapters, as well as
grey literature on co-regulation prepared for institutions
(Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], World Bank,
European Commission) which comment on historical in-
fluences, trends and motivations.
Based on these bodies of literature, a deductive
content analysis examined occurrences of the indica-
tors of the three types of legitimacy. For each dis-
course, we narrowed down the material to three em-
pirical examples that are treated in the literature as
representing the diversity of practices linked to each
discourse and which illustrate different legitimacy con-
structions. For co-regulation, these examples include:
(a) GlobalG.A.P., which assembles 50% of global retail
and agribusiness value-added, and certifies food sup-
pliers in 124 countries worldwide (GlobalG.A.P., 2019),
making this the world’s largest implementor of pri-
vate agri-food standards (Hachez & Wouters, 2011);
(b) the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), a collabo-
ration of Unilever and the World Wildlife Foundation
(WWF), working since 1996 to end unstainable seafood
provision; and (c) organic standards, which originated
from organic farmer associations and were later trans-
lated into international and regional public standards
(Schwindenhammer, 2017). From the food democracy lit-
erature, we discuss: (a) community food hubs, which are
mainly initiatives by small-scale producers and middle
class families in reaction to corporate agri-food systems
(Andretta & Guidi, 2017); (b) the non-genetically modi-
fied organism (GMO) label campaign in the US backed by
Food Democracy Now (Stephan, 2015) with a reported
650,000 farmers and citizen activists; and (c) the People’s
Food Policy initiative in Canada, led by city and provincial
food policy councils.
4. Legitimacy in the Co-Regulation Discourse
In this section we examine how each type of legitimacy
(input, output and throughput) is constructed in the
co-regulation discourse to legitimize private governance
norms and practices.
Input legitimacy in the co-regulatory discourse is
mostly linked to the inclusion of relevant knowledge.
Standards typically refer to scientific norms. Hatanaka
(2014, p. 138) lists scientific norms such as perceived
“disinterestedness, replicability and validity” as the foun-
dational elements in establishing and universalizing the
legitimacy of private agri-food governance, reflected in
the ability to provide food conformity and harmonization
despite diverse origins. This also applies to public agri-
food governance.Winickoff et al. (2005, p. 92) cite propo-
nents of science-based food regulation, who argue that
it “can be, and should be, understood not as usurping le-
gitimate democratic choices for stricter regulations, but
as enhancing the quality of rational democratic deliber-
ation about risk and its control.” The intended result of
the input of scientific norms and knowledge is therefore
a sense of trustworthiness which adheres to rationality
norms, although it has been criticized that science-based
methods of risk management embody Western norms
(Hatanaka, 2014; Winickoff et al., 2005).
The focus on knowledge inclusion prioritizes experts,
albeit not necessarily scientists, in standard-setting pro-
cesses. A closer look reveals that private standards are
typically not developed by scientists but by sector ex-
perts (Fuchs et al., 2009). In GlobalG.A.P., standards are
developed in technical committees with experts from
retail, producers and traders (GlobalG.A.P., 2019), re-
flecting their expertise, but also their practical needs.
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At the same time, GlobalG.A.P. standards often refer
to European public standards, potentially lending input
legitimacy from the parliamentary process. However,
GlobalG.A.P. extends these standards along the transna-
tional value chains to territories where citizens had no
input into the creation of the underlying public stan-
dards. Organic standards have been historically based on
the principles developed by practitioners organized in
organic farming associations and internationally harmo-
nized through their umbrella organization International
Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements, which
later informed Codex Alimentarius standards and differ-
entiated regional standards (Schwindenhammer, 2017).
To the degree that the organic principles are not strictly
based on scientific evidence, they present a different
type of input legitimacy that is based on trust in the or-
ganic community’s origins and values.
A second construction of input legitimacy is the adop-
tion of democratic norms of inclusiveness through prac-
tices such as multi-stakeholder participation and repre-
sentation of public interest. In GlobalG.A.P.’s member-
ship model, for example, retailers and producers each
elect 50% of representatives to the board, and addi-
tional associate members from food services and agri-
cultural input firms consult in decision-making (Fuchs
et al., 2009). Wider stakeholder participation was also
introduced through focus groups, online public con-
sultations, and country partners (GlobalG.A.P., 2019),
including outreach to smallholder farmers in devel-
oping contexts who might be excluded from global
value chains (Fulponi, 2006). Given this effort, FAO has
deemed GlobalG.A.P. relatively open to stakeholder in-
put (Henson & Humphrey, 2009). Similarly, MSC garners
input legitimacy through CSO involvement and govern-
ment support. The MSC depends on participation of a
highly trusted environmental NGO, WWF, and partici-
pation of affected stakeholders (Osterveer, 2015). MSC
standards receive additional input legitimacy ex-post
when they are absorbed into national regulations (Steets,
2011). Together, CSO involvement and government over-
sight, as Guthman (1998, p. 137) observes in the case of
organic food standards, serve to “bolster and legitimize”
agribusiness involvement as well as “palliate opposi-
tional movements.” Stakeholder participation, though
emulating democratic input legitimacy, often remains
unequal, privileging powerful retailers and large suppli-
ers, with peripheral roles for consumers or farmers in the
Global South (Tallontire, Opondo, & Nelson, 2013). Even
with CSO involvement, resource asymmetries prevent
equal input from smaller actors and less well-resourced
organizations (Steets, 2011).
Output legitimacy is constructed in co-regulatory
discourse by emphasizing problem-solving capacity and
efficiency to safeguard public goods and ethical con-
cerns, interpreted as safe, abundant, ethical and ‘nat-
ural’ food choices for consumers. GlobalG.A.P., for ex-
ample, was created in order to restore consumer con-
fidence following state failures of food safety and loss
of public trust (Havinga, 2018). Efficient harmonization
also reduces costs and allows for process-based mar-
ket differentiation. Similarly, the global harmonization
of organic standards reassures consumers that products
from around the globe adhere to the same principles
(Schwindenhammer, 2017). The MSC scheme promises
to safeguard the public good by prohibiting destructive
fishing techniques and management of by-catch to meet
WWF criteria, but also allows food retailers and services
such as Wal-Mart and McDonald’s to distinguish prod-
uct lines for eco-minded consumers (Changing Markets
Foundation, 2018). In essence, the output-based legiti-
macy of co-regulation has two underlying assumptions:
that private standards need to complement public reg-
ulation to deliver on new consumer demands, and that
these solutions are only sustainable when aligned with
business interests. Output legitimacy is here constructed
as inextricably linked to market creation because the pri-
vate standards that complement public regulation en-
able newmarkets for emerging, differentiated consumer
demands. Thus, the delivery of desired public goods and
ethical outcomes synergize with the creation of oppor-
tunities for businesses and value chains that address
these concerns.
The new consumer preferences, such as those for
‘natural’ food, in turn provide novel opportunities to
increase output legitimacy through co-regulation. The
discourse of organic standards, for example, allows
value chain actors to construct their products as de-
rived from natural sources. Some consumers perceive co-
regulatory standards as the most efficient, convenient
means to “make nature safe and available” (Guthman,
2007, p. 150).
Output legitimacy of co-regulation is also con-
structed as fostering efficiency and innovation. Starting
with the British Food Safety Law in 1990, responsibil-
ity for the methods to ensure safe food shifted towards
the private sector. The European Commission (2017)
advocates a “clear allocation of responsibility to food-
handling businesses and farmers to comply with EU rules
associated with an obligation of self-control.” Private
standards and arms-length controls are heralded as cre-
ating the conditions for a “race to the top” (Levi-Faur,
2009, p. 182), a catalyst for progress and modernization
to improve supply chain capacity (World Bank, 2005),
and as “more flexible and agile in responding to a wide
range of continually evolving consumer preferences”
(Smith, 2009, p. 5). Overall, we find that the construction
of output legitimacy in the co-regulation discourse is de-
rived from specific capabilities associatedwith the public,
private and civil society sectors. Supposedly, only the in-
terplay of societal demand, public-private co-regulation
and business innovation delivers the desired outcome:
safe, healthy, ethical and sustainable food on differenti-
ated markets. The co-regulation discourse backgrounds
that this system ismostly geared towardsmarketable fea-
tures and the desires of a minority, namely wealthy con-
sumers in the Global North (Fuchs et al., 2009).
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Throughput legitimacy in co-regulation discourse re-
lates heavily to transparency and reliability processes
via adherence with publicized procedures for standard
setting, implementation and enforcement (Casey, 2017),
traceability schemes and, to a lesser degree, the per-
ception of deliberation among all relevant stakeholders.
MSC boasts a high level of transparency via access to
minutes of conferences, roundtables and videos (Fuchs
et al., 2009). Objections panels provide stakeholders
with means of formal complaint (Steets, 2011), while a
Board of Trustees provides independent oversight (Fuchs
et al., 2009). Reliable procedures “underline the pro-
fessionalism and independence of the verification pro-
cess” (Steets, 2011, p. 97). However, the construction of
throughput legitimacy runs into limitations because the
methodologies used and the results of the certification
processes, for example audits of GlobalG.A.P.-certified
food producers, are often confidential. Throughput legit-
imacy is achieved only insofar as internal private audi-
tors provide credible public information,while private au-
ditors may lack motivations for independence (Fagotto,
2017). Deliberation as a pillar of throughput legitimacy
construction is emphasized in the MSC model, which
strongly rests on its multi-stakeholder identity. At least
in principle this allows for deliberation among possibly
conflicting interests (Fuchs et al., 2009). The construction
of throughput legitimacy in the co-regulation discourse
again involves all sectors since private standards may
also borrow throughput legitimacy via a level of govern-
ment oversight or “orchestration” (van der Voort, 2015,
p. 17). However, government oversight is inherently lim-
ited for any national jurisdiction in the face of transna-
tional value chains.
Overall, our analysis shows a well-elaborated and
complex construction of legitimacy in the co-regulation
discourse: 1) the input legitimacy construct emphasizes
expertise of scientists and practitioners, complemented
by, albeit limited, participation opportunities for af-
fected groups and stakeholders; 2) the output legitimacy
construct connects effective and efficient provision of
safe, healthy, sustainable and ethical food with the cre-
ation of differentiated markets through the interplay of
public and private regulation; and 3) throughput legiti-
macy is constructed around notions of reliable, indepen-
dent auditing, traceability, and varying degrees of trans-
parency and deliberation in rulemaking.
5. Legitimacy in Food Democracy Discourse
Wenow turn to the construction of legitimacy in the food
democracy discourse. Here, regarding input legitimacy,
we find a strong emphasis on grassroots, community-
based participation to re-establish value-based agri-food
systems. As Rossi (2017, p. 17) notes, values, knowl-
edge and preferences “lead to the realm of food democ-
racy.” Undesired outcomes are explained by lack of value-
based democratic participation. For Food Democracy
Now (Stephan, 2015), GMOs represent this distinct lack
of values and public input. In the American context,
the absence of mandatory GMO labelling is critiqued as
denial of opportunities for value expression (Hamilton,
2005).While labelling is generally an element of through-
put legitimacy by creating transparency, the absence of
labels is seen as compromising input legitimacy by re-
ducing choice options for consumers. With non-GMO
activism, as Shiva (2003) argues, grassroots efforts can
effectively combat the “denied freedom of information
and freedom of choice because of corporate control and
dependency.” This is echoed by Anderson (2008) who
points to the supermarket as a place where shoppers
supposedly have unlimited choices, and yet the free-
dom to make critical decisions, such as avoiding GMO
products, was unavailable. Here, input legitimacy in the
food democracy discourse is constructed as political con-
sumerism, where everyday food choices express individ-
ual ethical values (Andretta & Guidi, 2017), and “each
trip to buy food is really a visit to the polling place”
(Hamilton, 2005, p. 22).
However, other voices in the food democracy dis-
course critique this form of political consumerism as
a limited expression of self-interests (Hassanein, 2003)
which may encourage corporate capture of values for
the purpose of expanding new markets (Johnston et al.,
2009). In contrast, the food policy council movement
emphasizes collective participation in civic life along-
side elected representatives in order to counteract a de-
coupling of states from society (Moragues-Faus, 2016).
This is illustrated by the food policy councils where cit-
izen consultation is protected by public act or joint res-
olutions (Fox, 2010). One of the Toronto food policy
council’s tasks has been “to propose policy at all lev-
els of government, and to find ways of integrating com-
munity experiences” (Welsh & MacRae, 1998, p. 249).
Here, input legitimacy is linked to the knowledge and
values of citizens and to direct interactions with munic-
ipal representatives.
Output legitimacy is constructed in the food democ-
racy discourse by challenging the dominant paradigm of
food provision through standardization and economies
of scale (Lang, 1999). Pointing to trade-offs between effi-
ciency and control, part of the food democracy discourse
emphasizes efficacy of output, described by Hassanein
(2008) as the combination of the capacity to act and
make an impact. Efficacy is seen as important to maxi-
mize protection of the public good, though this is inter-
preted in different ways. As both Hassanein (2008) and
Rose (2017) observe in community food initiatives, the
capacity to act and impact is also felt in the hands-on
production of food for alternative markets, particularly
those which benefit lower-income consumers.
However, alternative constructions of output legiti-
macy emerge in the discourse that focus more on col-
lective political efficacy than individual choice. From this
perspective, individual efficacy may produce a sense
of freedom and self-empowerment, but could subdue
attempts at higher-level political change (Rossi, 2017).
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Output legitimacy then requires reduced individualism
and, in its place, work towards the preservation of com-
mon pool resources and the adoption of good public
policy. Here, the state, pressured into action by active
food citizens, becomes the facilitator of a “new collec-
tivism” (Lang, 1999, p. 221). An example for such a
discourse that advocates a “people-centered, counter-
hegemonic policy-making process” (Levkoe & Sheedy,
2017, p. 2) is the Canadian People’s Food Policy. The out-
put legitimacy of food councils in Canada is constructed
through strengthening of common resources and a com-
mon sense of civic impact (Welsh & MacRae, 1998). This
reflects a two-dimensional construction of output legit-
imacy in the food democracy discourse, with consumer
efficacy protecting freedom and choice, but also wider
citizen-based structural efficacy. According to Gómez-
Benito and Lozano (2014, p. 145):
If there were interest [sic] in highlighting consumers’
obligations, the focus would be located beyond the
market and would be oriented not only toward indi-
vidual issues, but also toward structural factors and
issues that affect the entire group of citizens.
Throughput legitimacy in the food democracy discourse
requires high standards of transparency. This can be ob-
tained through accountability to civil society through
consumer information, or by directly empowering open
citizen deliberation. In the first perspective, the state has
a limited role to facilitate consumer education and to sup-
port alternative food movements, for example through
financing community food hubs. Emphasis is put on pri-
vate sector accountability to new consumer demands for
transparency, and governance responsibility to address
market failures through information asymmetry—e.g.,
by establishing non-GMO labels that enable consumers
to avoid genetically modified products. Labels are also
used by community food hubs as a way to self-certify,
providing assurance that products are seasonal, non-
industrial, and fair, with the result that consumers could
buy the product without question (Chiffoleau, Millet-
Amrani, & Canard, 2016).
Although labels promote throughput legitimacy via
transparency, parts of the food democracy discourse
warn that a focus on labels may limit wider deliberation.
For the decision-making process to be trusted, there
must be the “opportunity to debate, to learn about the
local food system and from each other, and to choose
collectively what could be focused on and prioritized”
(Chiffoleau et al., 2016, p. 10). Hassanein (2008) likewise
notes that community coalitions require different inter-
ests to be negotiated. There is more promotion of trans-
parent processes which guarantee food citizens a place
in policy debates (Gómez-Benito & Lozano, 2014). These
debates, through food policy councils for example, can
provide “some credibility in places where none would
normally be possible” (Welsh&MacRae, 1998, p. 251). In
this vein, a democratic society “must be able to guaran-
tee themeaningful and active involvement of all individu-
als, groups and institutions in decision-making” (People’s
Food Policy Project, 2011). This second food democracy
perspective promotes inclusive deliberative processes to
ensure accountability, and an inclusive and transparent
political public sphere that is distinct from markets and
not dominated by strategic interests.
Overall, our analysis of the food democracy discourse
reveals two distinct articulations of each of the three di-
mensions of legitimacy:
1) While input legitimacy is strongly linked to value-
based knowledge and the application of democ-
racy norms, the emphasis is either on the individ-
ual choices of concerned consumers or on citizens
participating in collective action;
2) While output legitimacy is consistently based on
efficacy and protection of the public good, efficacy
is linked either to consumer freedom or to commu-
nity resources;
3) Throughput legitimacy is mainly constructed ei-
ther as transparency based on consumer informa-
tion or as the opening up of wider, deliberative pol-
icy processes.
The two strands of the food democracy discourse char-
acterized above resonate with established characteriza-
tions of ‘liberal’ and ‘strong democracy’ (Barber, 1984).
We therefore propose to distinguish two distinct articula-
tions of the food democracy discourse: the first, referred
to here as liberal food democracy, emphasizes input legit-
imacy from consumer participation in order to pressure
market actors to deliver products and services that corre-
spond to consumers’ ethical values. This vision conceives
of output legitimacy as market responsiveness and max-
imized consumer choice, and throughput legitimacy as
transparency, traceability and accountability. This form
of participation has been criticized over a tendency to
water down inclusion and reciprocity and to lose legiti-
macy due to overreliance on purchasing power (Renting,
Schermer, & Rossi, 2012). This aligns with Barber’s (1984,
p. 4) criticism of a lack of public accountability in liberal
democracy, from which “no firm theory of citizenship,
participation, public goods or civic virtue could be ex-
pected to arise.”
The second articulation, strong food democracy, em-
phasizes citizen-based throughput legitimacy by way of
processes which counter corporate power with civic
power, public accountability, and state oversight (de
Schutter, 2017; Hassanein, 2008; Moragues-Faus, 2016;
for an example of strong food democracy that empha-
sizes participation and conflict as constitutive for food
democracy, see Friedrich, Hackfort, Boyer, & Gottschlich,
2019). In this articulation, the expected output is a com-
mon “ethics of interdependence, sustainability, health
and justice over those of profit and individualism”
(People’s Food Policy Project, 2011). This reflects a call
for strong interaction and collaboration, which resonates
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with Barber’s (1984, p. 207) strong democracy concept
where participation and “talk” creates a reciprocal en-
vironment, or a “listening citizenry.” Its proponents ar-
gue that this strong interaction among citizens generates
values of mutuality and reciprocity, interweaving inclu-
sive input, participatory throughput and common good-
oriented output legitimacy to represent an alternative
form of agri-food governance.
6. Discussion
Our analysis reveals a complex interplay between com-
peting concepts of input, throughput and output legiti-
macy in the co-regulation discourse and the two distinct
articulations—liberal and strong—of the food democ-
racy discourse (see Table 2 for an overview). From a re-
flexive governance perspective (Feindt &Weiland, 2018),
all three discourses constitute specific representations
of the objects and subjects of agri-food governance,
which creates potential barriers tomutual understanding
and inclusive compromise. However, there is an observ-
able overlap between the co-regulation and the liberal
food democracy discourses; although the first is based
on issues of coordination, problem-solving and harmo-
nization and the second on value realization, respon-
siveness and accountability, both discourses overlap in
putting consumer choice at the center of their concep-
tion of input legitimacy. Regarding output legitimacy,
both discourses emphasize the conditions under which
market mechanisms work to solve collective coordina-
tion and information problems. The result is a shared fo-
cus on procedures that create transparency along com-
plex value chains through a system of standards, moni-
toring and labelling that evolves in response to changing
consumer demands. Public goods can then be realized
because consumers want them and ‘vote with the dollar.’
Differences, however, remain. In the liberal food democ-
racy discourse, as in classical theories of liberal democ-
racy, fair and open competition is the main mechanism
that generates amovement towards the public good and
creates benefits for a majority. The role of the state is to
guarantee public health and safety and to ensure a level
playing field with regard to all other aspects, including
that private standards are notmisleading or used to stifle
competition. From a liberal food democracy perspective,
co-regulation in transnational value chains must there-
fore be linked to oversight through democratically con-
trolled agencies with effective accountability to citizens
and their elected representatives. In contrast, the co-
regulation discourse accepts dominantly private account-
ability arrangements as long as coordination problems
are solved efficiently and the system is perceived as fair
and reliable by market partners and consumers.
In contrast, the strong food democracy discourse em-
phasizes throughput legitimacy through open, inclusive
and deliberative processes aimed at generating consen-
sus and solidarity, and at producing common values and
resources. It resonateswith an expectation that is central
to theories of Habermasian deliberative democracy: that
common deliberation will transform participants’ pref-
erences and that the deliberating public will educate it-
self. Citizen-based networks and food councils express
the idea that the agri-food system should mainly be gov-
erned by the shared deliberation of citizens, including in
national and transnational fora, not by the fragmented
transactions of consumers.
7. Conclusion
The food democracy discourse has emerged as a norma-
tively grounded critique of an increasingly transnational
agri-food system, where private norms and standards in-
Table 2. Comparison of legitimacy in co-regulation and food democracy discourses.
Legitimacy type Co-regulatory food Liberal food democracy Strong food democracy
discourse discourse discourse
Input legitimacy Voting with the dollar;
expertise
Participation through






Output legitimacy Efficiency in satisfying
differentiated consumer
demand through public and








of public goods; common
values













deliberation based on food
citizenship
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teract with public policy and regulation in complex ways
that elude traditional models of democratic accountabil-
ity. Our analysis aimed to reconstruct the underlying le-
gitimacy constructions supporting co-regulation as well
as food democracy conceptions. It generated three im-
portant insights: first, it is important to distinguish be-
tween two different articulations of the food democ-
racy discourse, which we labelled liberal and strong food
democracy; second, conceptualizations of legitimacy in
the liberal food democracy and the co-regulatory dis-
course share an emphasis on market mechanisms and
private sector initiatives. However, legitimacy in the
co-regulatory discourse relies more heavily on output
(delivering ample safe, reliable, sustainable and ethical
food choices to improve consumer confidence in global
food chains), while the liberal food democracy discourse
is more sensitive to issues of input and throughput legit-
imacy such as fair opportunity for value expression and
market power; and third, the strong food democracy dis-
course articulates a critical counter-model that empha-
sizes inclusive deliberation, which in turn is expected to
generate reciprocal norms, a shared orientation towards
the common good and countervailing power.
Our analysis contributes to linking two proliferating
bodies of literature that address either co-regulation in
agri-food governance (e.g., Verbruggen &Havinga, 2017)
or food democracy (Behringer, 2019). The focus on legit-
imacy constructions helps to better understand the con-
tested political arguments embedded in current debates
about governance of the agri-food system. Legitimacy
constructions provide authority tomodels of social order
embodied in a governance arrangement. Analytical re-
construction renders visible their historical contingency
as the outcome of political struggles over power and con-
trol. Finding counter-discourses that challenge a domi-
nant governance model and its discursive justification
helps to clarify these struggles and the alternative mod-
els of authority and control at stake. Via discourses
which emphasize the roles of actors other than state
and civil society, democracy norms can be transferred
to legitimize private authority over food. The presence
of a counter-discourse, such as strong food democracy,
makes such a legitimacy transfer more difficult and—
through its coordinative and mobilizing functions—has
the potential to create new tensions and challenges for
private power.
This contribution could only outline the competing
constructions of legitimacy in agri-food governance. On
this basis,we suggest three directions for future research.
The first direction links up with political theory and his-
tory of political ideas and aims for a more in-depth in-
quiry into the legitimacy constructions, their historical
roots and ideational resonance. The second direction
links discourse analysis to a micro-analysis of regula-
tory practices and aims to assess how the different dis-
courses affect the practice of co-regulation. The third di-
rection takes a comparative approach and aims to under-
stand how different regulatory practices and legitimacy
claims interact in different countries and different value
chains, and how they evolve over time. The combination
of conceptual-argumentative, regulatory and compara-
tive analysis will allow us to better understand whether
and how the governance of agri-food systems lives up to
democratic ideals and ambitions.
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